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Abstract. We use data from the Canadian Workplace and Employee Survey (1999-2002) to 
assess the take-up of family-friendly benefits that are provided by employers. We distinguish 
between availability and actual use of benefits to account for worker selection into firms 
according to benefit availability. We find that selection is important for understanding the take-
up of family-friendly benefits, although it does not differ much between genders. We also find 
that the provision of these benefits helps workers relatively little to manage the work-family 
conflict and benefits are often unavailable to those who need them most. Our findings suggest 
that the market fails to help employees balance their family-work conflict. 
Keywords: work and family balance, family-friendly benefits, take up of employer benefits 
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Private employers increasingly offer family-friendly benefits such as flexible work schedules, 
telework, and daycare services. In principle, these benefits meet significant social demands 
from those workers who seek to balance work-family conflict. Accordingly, workers with 
specific family characteristics are expected to search for jobs that offer the benefits most 
appropriate to their specific needs. In practice, however, little is known about the actual 
take-up of available family-friendly benefits among different workers. Consequently, little is 
known about whether or not benefits are made available to the workers who need them, 
and whether the available benefits meet the specific needs of these workers. The answer to 
these questions is of direct practical relevance to employers and employees. It is also 
relevant for understanding whether adequate social protection can be met by the market 
rather than the government.  
 
We assess the take-up of family-friendly benefits that are provided by employers using the 
Canadian Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) for the period 1999-2002. We find a 
somewhat surprisingly low take-up of these benefits, particularly of family support services. 
Overall we find that selection effects are important for understanding the take-up of these 
benefits. The WES indicates that about 57% of employees in Canada work in firms that 
offer flexible work schedules, 11% work in firms that offer telework, and 12% work in firms 
that offer family support services, such as daycare. The take-up of benefits varies by 
benefit. Conditional on working on a firm that offers the service, 60% of the workers use 




 The take-up of benefits, particularly of family support services, is lower than the 
percentage of the working population that is expected to face family-work conflict – those in 
dual earner families with young children or single parents, roughly over 60% of the labour 
force). Discrepancies between use and availability of benefits may indicate that workers 
who need the benefits do not have access to them. Alternatively, such discrepancies may 
indicate that workers with families do not find family-friendly workplace benefits very useful.  
We ask the following question regarding privately provided family-friendly benefits: why do 
we not observe higher levels of take-up for these benefits? Is it because benefits are not 
useful to workers; or is it because workers that need the benefits have no access to them? 
Our analysis reveals two things. First, selection issues are important in understanding the 
take-up of employer provided benefits. Second, after correcting for selection, not all benefits 
are equally useful. Workers do not seem to use flexible schedules to achieve work-life 
balance. Telework, on the other hand, seems to be related to factors measuring family work 
conflict for female workers. Family support services, such as day care, do not seem in turn, 
to be offered to workers who would find them more useful. These findings suggest that the 
market fails to help employees balance work and family demands. Hence a substantial role 
for government policy exists in this area.  
 
                                                 
1 In the U.S., a 1993 Work/Family Directions study of 80 top U.S. corporations reports that 85% of these companies 
offer flexible work programs. In turn, fewer than 26% of employees used any of these services (Salomon 1994). In 
the U.K., Gray (2000) reports that according to the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998, 15.2% of private 
companies offer flexible work or shorter week work, 10% offer telework, and 4.5% offer workplace nurseries or 
financial assistance with childcare. No information on use is available for similar benefits.   1
1. Introduction  
Private employers increasingly offer family-friendly benefits such as flexible work 
schedules, telework, and daycare services. In principle, these benefits meet significant social 
demands from those workers who seek to balance work-family conflict. Theoretically, workers 
with specific family characteristics are expected to search for jobs that offer the benefits most 
appropriate to their specific needs. In practice, however, little is known about the actual take-up 
of available family-friendly benefits among different workers. Therefore, little is known about 
whether or not benefits are made available to the workers who need them, or whether or not the 
available benefits do meet the specific needs of these workers. The answer to these questions is 
of direct practical relevance to employers and employees. It is also relevant for understanding 
whether or not adequate social protection can be met by the market rather than the government.  
In this paper, we asses the take-up of family-friendly benefits that are provided by 
employers using the Canadian Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) for the period 1999-
2002. We distinguish between the availability and the actual use of these benefits and account for 
workers selection into firms according to family-friendly benefits. Overall we find that selection 
effects are important for understanding the take up of these benefits, although surprisingly do not 
always differ by gender. We also find that the provision of benefits appears to help workers 
relatively little to manage the work-family conflict and that the benefits are often unavailable to 
those who would need them most. Our findings suggest that the market fails to help employees 
balance their family-work conflict 
The WES is a unique data set for assessing the impact of family-friendly benefits. 
Typically, the impact of these benefits is hard to quantify. The evidence is fragmented into 
diverse studies which use different measures of availability. While firm surveys tend to have 
    2
availability questions, employee surveys have only questions regarding workers’ use of these 
benefits. Furthermore, nationally representative surveys do not routinely include this information 
in their questionnaires and evidence is often drawn from very limited surveys covering a small 
number of firms in specific industries or particular locations. In contrast, the WES surveys a 
nationally representative sample of Canadian firms and their employees. This link between 
workplaces and employees allows us to connect employee characteristics, such as use of family-
friendly benefits, education, and hours of work, with firm characteristic such as availability of 
benefits, organizational changes, and human resources practices. To our knowledge, this is the 
only data set that has a large, representative sample as well as the employee-employer 
connection.  
A cursory look at the WES indicates that about 57% of employees in Canadian firms 
offer flexible work schedules, 11% work in firms offering telework, and 12% in firms offering 
family support services, such as daycare. The conditional take-up of benefits also varies by type 
of benefit, with 65% of workers using flex-time given that it is offered by their firm, 50% using 
telework, and 17% using family support services.
1 Further, the take up of benefits is much lower 
than the percentage of the working population that is expected to face family-work conflict – 
those in dual earner families with young children or single parents. For instance, in 2002, 72% of 
all couples (up from 33% in 1965) and over 60% of all Canadian two-parent households with 
                                                 
1 In the U.S., a 1993 Work/Family Directions study of 80 top U.S. corporations reports that 85% of these companies 
offer flexible work programs. In turn, fewer than 26% of employees used any of these services (Salomon 1994). 
These numbers are not conditional on availability. Equivalent absolute use frequencies in the WES are: 37% for use 
of flex-time, 6% for use of telework, and 2% for use of family support services. In the U.K., Gray (2000) reports that 
according to the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998, 15.2% of private companies offer flexible work or 
shorter week work, 10% offer telework, and 4.5% offer workplace nurseries or financial assistance with childcare. 
No information on use is available for similar benefits. 
    3
dependents were dual earners households, while 63% of all single parents worked.
2 In addition, 
although families with dependents do have a slightly higher use of telework (6.7% among 
females with dependents versus the average use of 4.8%), that is not the case for the use of 
flexible schedules (34.6% of females with dependents use flexible schedules versus the average 
of 34.7%).
3 The above figures suggest two things: a) substantial under-use of available benefits 
among workers who could potentially benefit from them and b) differences in the usefulness of 
different benefits.  
Discrepancies between use and availability of benefits may indicate that workers who 
need the benefits do not have access to them. Alternatively, such discrepancies may indicate that 
workers with families do not find family-friendly workplace benefits very useful. For instance, 
flexible hours may be of little use to full time working parents of pre-school children, as they 
may prefer full time care for their children, which is mostly available during regular work hours; 
telework may have limited usefulness to parents of small children, as they need to be attended to, 
and working at home restricts the attention that can be given to a child; childcare or eldercare 
may be quite useful, but only provided that the worker has children or eldercare responsibilities. 
We try to distinguish between these two reasons for low take up.  
To address these issues, we distinguish between use and availability of benefits and 
employ this distinction to estimate determinants of use of benefits, taking into account worker 
selection into employment conditions and using technical constraints in the provision of 
available benefits as exclusion restrictions in a two-step estimation procedure. We find that 
selection issues are important for all except one of the benefit-gender group combinations 
                                                 
2 Similarly, in the US (2005), 51% of all couples and 61% of two-parent households with dependents were dual 
earners households and 74% of all single parents worked. Federal Labour Standards Review and US Department of 
Labour (See  http://www.fls_ntf.gc.ca/en/bg_01.asp and  http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/famee.pdf ) 
3 Authors’ calculations using the WES. 
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studied (male workers using telework). Furthermore, after correcting for selection, not all 
benefits are equally useful. The use of flexible time seems unrelated to work-family conflict. 
Telework, on the other hand, seems to be related to factors measuring family work conflict for 
female workers, whereas family support services such as day-care do not seem to be offered to 
workers who would find them more useful.  
Literature Review 
Work-family conflict has potentially important social costs that have been investigated by 
the human resource literature. Baum (2003) and Ruhm (2004) among others explore the 
relationship between benefits and the development of learning skills in young children. Work 
family conflict may also considerably increase medical costs Duxbury and Higgins (2004). 
Consequences of the work-family conflict range from mental health disorders, physical health 
problems, family strain, employee absenteeism, high turnover rates and low productivity.
4  
Research on family-friendly practices also looks into employers’ benefits of 
implementing these practices. Gray (2002) uses British data on an employee-workplace linked 
survey to look at the impact of a wide arrangement of workplace characteristics (including 
family-friendly benefits) on several measures of firm outcomes, finding a positive association 
between family-friendly benefits and most measures of firm outcomes. Glass and Riley (1998) 
use American data to look at the impact of family responsive policies on employee retention 
after childbirth, and find positive effects of maternity leave policies on reducing turnover. More 
generally, Eaton (2003) suggests that family supportive practices involving flexibility increase 
commitment on the part of the workers, therefore increasing productivity and reducing turnover. 
We do not analyze direct measures of firm performance in relation to benefit availability, as 
                                                 
4 See Allen el Al. (2000) for a survey on the effects of the work-family conflict on workers. 
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these studies do. Rather, by understanding the reasons for low take up of benefit we shed light 
into the channels through which the interaction between benefits and firm outcomes can occur.   
Methodologically, a distinction between use and availability of privately provided 
benefits is usually not even made in the majority of studies of privately provided benefits.
5 As a 
consequence, conventional (OLS) estimates of the factors influencing use of benefits are likely 
biased because of sample selection since use of benefits is not observable unless the worker has 
the benefit available. Further, to address the question of whether or not the benefit is useful or 
whether or not workers have access to potentially useful benefits, it is not enough to restrict our 
attention to those workers who have the benefit available, as it is plausible that workers 
characteristics are correlated to the provision of benefits. Our work tries to improve on these 
conventional estimates of the use of benefits by accounting for this selection problem 
Previous studies on employer characteristics associated with benefit availability find that, 
in general, family-friendly benefits are found in larger, unionized firms (Glass and Fujimoto, 
1995). Golden (2001) looks into the characteristics of employees who do not work a standard 
schedule (voluntarily) and finds that females with dependents, Caucasians, union members, the 
more educated long-serving employees, and private sector employees are more likely to engage 
in this practice. Finally, there is some research centered specifically on the use of work-family 
benefits, although ignoring selection effects. It has developed outside economics and is, in 
general, constrained both in the scope of benefits and in the extent of the sample studied.
6 In 
contrast, we exploit the advantages of substantially larger samples and take into account the 
selection of workers into firms according to benefit availability. 
                                                 
5 The  low take up of public benefits, on the other hand, has been extensively analyzed. See Moffitt (1983) and 
Curry (2004).  
6 See for instance, Secret (2000), whose study is limited to 88 organizations of a local North American community 
employing 527 workers.   
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We next present the empirical methodology and describe the data we use for the analysis.  
Section 3 shows our results and discusses its implications and robustness. Section 4 concludes.  
2. Methodology 
Government involvement in the provision of family-friendly benefits consists generally in 
the regulation of leave, pregnancy related insurance, and the provision of subsidies for 
schooling/care for children.
7 In this paper, however, we focus solely on the role of employers in 
the provision of family-friendly benefits. Family-friendly workplace benefits are crucial in 
countries with low government involvement in social matters, but even in countries with 
significant welfare states, employers may play an important role in the mitigation of the work-
family conflict by offering employees additional flexibility. For instance, families may prefer the 
possibility of working from home to save commuting time, or to have flexible schedules to 
accommodate unexpected changes in caregiver schedules. These are types of family-friendly 
practices that depend mainly on the firm and can hardly be subject to regulation. Further, a 
correct assessment of the need for additional public family-friendly services requires an 
understanding of the scope and effects of those that are privately provided.
8 Finally, as indicated 
above, the provision of workplace family-friendly benefits may be in the interest of employers 
themselves, hence justifying further attention to these practices.  
These (firm provided) family-friendly benefits are practices introduced voluntarily by the 
firms to help workers to reconcile the demands of work and family life. Firms have different 
                                                 
7  See, for instance, Klerman and Leibowitz (1990), and Cleveland, Gunderson and Hyatt (1996). There is also much 
variation in the public provision of family benefits across countries, Ruhm (1998), Gornick, Meyers and Ross 
(1996).  
8 The gains of expanding public programs depends critically on the extent to which public eligibility will cover just 
the uninsured, or will crowd out existing private coverage For instance, the evidence indicates that crowding out 
exists in the case of medical services, Cutler and Gruber (1996).  
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instruments at hand to help employees deal with work-family conflict. They could be classified 
in three groups:  
a)  Policies facilitating leave from work. These include extensions to maternity leave, paid or 
unpaid, other forms of parental leave and the possibility of taking career breaks. 
b)  Policies facilitating changes in the work schedule. These include all forms of work schedule 
reductions, including flexible hours or work from home (telework). 
c)  Family support policies, which offer practical help with child or elder care. 
Our paper analyzes generic family support policies (c) and two specific types of policies 
that facilitate changes in work schedule: telework and flexible hours. 
The interpretative framework for this paper is rooted in Becker’s (1965, 1991) new home 
economics and on the theory of the firm. If certain family oriented benefits and workplace 
arrangements exist, they must benefit either employers, via increased employee productivity, or 
employees, via contributions that improve their family life. We assume that the benefit/cost of 
workplace benefits and arrangements to the employee can be captured by looking at employee’s 
attachment to the firm and are not concerned with that choice.
9 Under this assumption, 
individuals will use benefits if they face enough family conflict and a suitable benefit is offered 
by the firm. The trade-offs regarding the take-up of family-friendly benefits are similar to those 
discussed in the literature on take-up of public benefits: lack of information, transaction costs 
and stigma or, more likely, a combination of the three. Lack of information is not rare as firms 
rarely have explicit policies regarding flexible hours or telework. It is usually left to managers’ 
discretion whether a worker is able to use these benefits (Salomon (1994)). Transaction costs 
may arise because making arrangements to use flexible time or telework may increase the 
                                                 
9 We comment later in the text on the implications of considering the choice of workplaces that provide family 
benefits.  
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difficulty of working in teams or require investment in home office equipment. Regarding 
stigma, Eaton (2003) documents the existence of a corporate culture that limits use of available 
benefits because workers feel that it would negatively affect their careers. It follows that, for a 
fixed cost/stigma associated with taking the benefit, individuals will do so if the pressure from 
managing the demands from work and family is high enough.  
The literature on work-family conflict hypothesizes a relationship between work-family 
conflict (WFC) and family structure (FS). It is expected that workers with more or younger 
children or those with less flexibility to manage care responsibility (because of an absent partner) 
will be more likely to use benefits. If this is the case, one could conclude that benefits appear to 
contribute to lessen work-family conflict, since individuals with plausibly higher conflict are 
more likely to use them. Therefore, we will measure the magnitude of work-family conflict with 
indicators for family characteristics that are plausibly correlated with the amount of conflict 
faced.  
Consider a simplified version of Moffit’s (1983) model of benefit take up, where the 
extent of work-family conflict is, however, not observable. What we observe is the individual’s 
use of family-friendly benefits. Given a fixed individual cost of using the benefit, a “use of 
benefit” equation could be stated as  
Pr (BU  = 1 | FS) = Pr (WFC > 0 | FS) Ф(αFS )   (1) 
where BBU  is an indicator equal to 1 if the individual uses the benefit, Ф represents the normal 
cumulative density function, and α is a vector of parameters indicating the effect of family 
structure and other variables on benefit use. BU
B   is only observed if the (unobserved) work family 
conflict is greater than the (fixed) costs of using the benefit.   
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  If workers were randomly distributed across firms, estimates of equation (1) would 
provide estimates of the causal effect of each factor on the use of a given benefit. However, 
individuals work in firms or areas with different probabilities of offering family-friendly 
benefits, as organizations themselves are constrained in the supply of the benefits (Heywood et 
Al. 2005). There may be technical constraints in the provision of benefits, such as the feasibility 
of offering telework. In addition, the structure of the labour market may also influence the 
availability of these benefits, inducing the firms to respond to aggregate characteristics of local 
labour markets. For instance, firms hiring from a labour market characterized with skills 
shortages will benefit more from offering compensation packages that are attractive to their 
employee demographic groups.
10 The benefit to the firm of supplying these benefits is not 
observed. Instead we observe whether or not the benefit is available. 
Since benefit use cannot be observed unless the benefit is offered by the firm, estimates 
of equation (1) will be biased, as they would be based on the sample of workers for whom the 
benefit is available, rather than on a random sample of workers. To take this selection into 
account we will estimate the joint bivariate distribution of use and availability to obtain the 
probability of use free of this selection bias.
11  
BBU   = αFS + βX+ ε;          where BU  
B > 0 ↔ BBA > 0 
 BBA =  W γ + Lτ  + υ  > 0     (2) 
where BB
                                                
A is an indicator of availability of benefits, W is a vector of workers’ attributes and firm 
characteristics influencing the provision of benefits, L is a vector of variables describing the 
structure of the labour market from where the firm is likely to hire its workers, and (γ, τ) are the 
 
10 The Washington Post, Sunday, June 12, 2005; Page K01. 
11 This method was first proposed by Heckman (1974). Despite the strong functional form assumption, bivariate 
models have been shown to perform better than instrumental variable models in Montecarlo experiments (Deb, 
2007). 
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associated vectors of parameters. The error terms ε and ν are jointly normally distributed, 
independently of the variables in the respective equations, with zero expectations and corr(ε, ν) 
= ρ. The vector FS in the benefit use equation includes variables that predict employee use of 
benefits, such as marital status, indicators for age of children and indicators for number of 
children. The vector X represents additional variables that may influence benefit use.  
The regressors in the availability equation include variables that predict the employee's 
selection into firms offering the benefit, sometimes referred to as identifying restrictions. These 
include worker characteristics the employer may wish to retain/attract, like job tenure, 
experience, education and occupation indicator variables; firm characteristics that impose 
technical restrictions on benefit availability such as industry and firm size indicator variables; 
and characteristics of the labour market from where the firm is likely to hire their employees, 
such as the fraction of male and female skilled workers in the strata, the fraction of women of 
child bearing age in the strata, the fraction of the strata that is unionized and  the fraction of 
unionized females of child bearing age in the strata.
12  
Discussion: what we do and what we do not do 
We are aware that the empirical determination of benefit availability and benefit use is a 
complex process. First, availability is only observed for individuals who decided to work, which 
may lead to further sample selection issues. In this respect our estimates are conditional on 
employment and we implicitly assume that a wider availability of workplace offered benefits 
would have a negligible impact on whether an individual chooses to work or not.
13 We are 
                                                 
12 A strata (defined by the set of observations in a given province, industry and firm size) reflects the geographic 
location from where the firm is more likely to draw their workers.  
13 Blank (1990) finds that this type of selectivity is unlikely to influence the estimated coefficients of benefit 
availability. 
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considering here relatively “small” and often informal practices and as such we think them 
unlikely to be a major determinant of labor supply.
14  
Regarding the use of benefits, it is likely that workers’ access to benefits embodies a trade 
off between family-friendly benefits and other forms of compensation. In this case, the demand 
for benefits could also be modeled as the result of a simultaneous choice over wages and other 
job characteristics that influence their provision.
15 We view that as a separate, if related, 
question. Here, we abstract from this trade off to focus on the factors that affect the actual use of 
benefits. As discussed above, the empirical determination of benefit availability and benefit use 
is a complex process. Therefore, our estimates are conditional on employment and assume that 
increasing privately offered benefits will have a negligible impact on an individual’s choice to 
work. We also abstract from the trade off between wage and benefits that is likely to be implicit 
in contract determination to focus on the factors that affect the actual use of benefits.  
We are trying to answer a relatively basic question regarding the use of family-friendly 
benefits: Once firms have decided whether or not to offer such benefits, and workers have 
chosen appropriate “compensation/family-benefits” packages, why do we not observe high levels 
of take-up for these benefits? Is it because benefits are not useful to workers? Or is it because 
workers that need the benefits have no access to them? We can answer this question with our 
stylized model. Unconstrained probit estimates of benefit use, such as those proposed in (1), 
asses the influence of the demographic characteristics measuring work-family conflict on the 
probability of using benefits among those who have benefits available. The selection corrected 
use equation in (2) asses the influence of these demographic characteristics on the probability of 
                                                 
14 This will probably not hold in the case of a wider availability of publicly provided benefits, specially subsidized 
daycare (Baker, Gruber and Milligan, 2005) or if the workplace provision significantly lowers childcare pecuniary 
costs for certain groups (Anderson and Levine, 1999). 
15 Averett and Hotchkiss (1995).   
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using benefits for a random sample of workers. By comparing the two sets of estimates we gain 
insight into the usefulness of family-friendly benefits to mitigate work-family conflict and into 
the selection process of workers into firms with benefits. If, for instance, the demographic 
variables used to measure family conflict are not significant among workers with available 
benefits, but they are significant determinants of use of benefits among a random sample of 
workers -- producing significant estimates in equation (2), but not in equation (1) -- it would 
indicate that workers with available benefits do not use the benefit to reduce work-family 
conflict, although the benefit would be useful for the general population. This would support the 
hypothesis of a mismatch between use and availability of benefits. Alternatively, if the variables 
that measure family conflict are significant determinants of use of benefits among those who 
have available benefits, but not among a random sample of workers -- producing significant 
estimates in equation (1), but not in equation (2) -- this would support the notion that workers 
with high levels of work-family conflict are more likely to be in jobs that offer family-friendly 
benefits (no mismatch).  
Finally, we are not considering that workers’ skills may represent endogenous choices on 
the part of workers who anticipate that they will eventually use benefits and therefore choose 
skills and occupations more likely to offer these. If this is the case, our selection-corrected 
estimates of the probability of use could differ from estimates that take into account this 
additional selection issue. There are however, two characteristics regarding family-friendly 
benefits that support our choice of abstracting from this issue. One is that many career choices 
that may determine availability of benefits in the future are made well before the worker faces 
high levels of family-work conflict and can be considered, to some extent, independent of benefit 
use. This is the case with education level or occupation. In addition, benefits like telework or 
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flexible hours, unlike other fringe benefits, are very often not formal policies, but are at the 
manager’s discretion. Therefore, it is rather unlikely, at least for two of the policies we study 
here, that workers making skill choices are taking the availability of future family-friendly 
benefits into consideration.   
3. The Workplace Employee Survey 
This study uses data from the 1999-2002 Workplace and Employee Survey (WES). The 
survey collects a broad range of information on a nationally representative sample of employers 
and their employees, covering all industries except farming, fishing, hunting, trapping and public 
administration.
16 This is a very important aspect of the data as many studies are based on surveys 
with only a limited number of establishments surveyed. In addition, the linkage between 
employee and workplace data allows researchers to connect employee’s outcomes, such as use of 
benefits, not only with the worker’s own characteristics but also with firm characteristics, such as 
availability of benefits. These are extremely uncommon features in the literature on family-
friendly benefits. Indeed, to our knowledge this is the first study on benefit use that uses a 
nationally representative survey. The widespread representation of the sample, large sample sizes 
and the connection between employers and employees information provide a rare opportunity to 
improve on the methods used to determine the incidence of family-friendly benefits.  
We will examine the following employer provided family-friendly benefits: 
Flex-time or flexible hours: Under this work arrangement an employee works a certain number 
of core hours, but can change the start and stop times provided that a full complement of hours is 
                                                 
16  The survey frame on the workplace component was created from information on the Statistics Canada Business 
Register. Business locations were stratified into 252 relatively homogeneous groupings by industry (14), region (6) 
and size (3) called stratas, From these, 9,144 businesses were sampled in 1999 and 6,322 surveys collected. This 
sample is supplemented every two years with new workplaces added to the Business Register. Up to twenty four 
employees from every workplace (3.5 on average) were sampled using a probabilistic mechanism.  
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worked. Use is determined by answer to the following question, stated to explicitly minimize 
reporting error: “Do you work flexible hours? (This means you may work a certain number of 
core hours, but you can vary your start and stop times as long as your work the equivalent of a 
full work week)”. Since many firms do not have formal policies regarding flexible time, we 
construct a variable for flex-time availability at the firm based on this benefit being available to 
other similar workers in the firm.
17 Flexible time is used approximately by 37% of the workers 
and available to 56%. 
Telework: This is a type of work arrangement where employees work at home (for pay) at least 
some hours of their regular schedule. The employee responds the question: “Is your work at 
home mainly: a) Paid and within your normally scheduled work hours? b) Paid and in addition 
to your normally scheduled work hours? c) Unpaid and in addition to your normally scheduled 
work hours?”. We consider that a worker is using telework if he answers (a) to the above 
question. Similarly to the case of flex-time, we consider that telework is available if it is 
available to other workers in the firm with similar occupations (see footnote14). Approximately 
11% of the workers report having telework available, while 6% report use.  
Family support: The employee is asked a series of questions on employer support regarding 
childcare, eldercare, or other type of family support: “Does your employer offer help for 
childcare either through an on-site centre or assistance with external suppliers or informal 
arrangements?”, “Does your employer offer help with eldercare services?” and “Does your 
employer offer other personal support or family services?”. Each question is followed by a 
                                                 
17 A benefit is available if other workers in similar broadly defined occupations within the firm report using the 
benefit. This definition underestimates the availability of benefits. We also define a benefit as available if any 
employee in the firm reports using the benefit, which is likely to overestimate the incidence of availability. The 
results with the alternative definition (not reported here) are not significantly different from those using the more 
restrictive definition.  
    15
question regarding use (for instance, the question regarding childcare availability is followed by 
“Did you use this help within the past twelve months?”). We construct an indicator variable for 
“family support” equal to 1 if the employee answered that either one of these three benefits is 
offered by the employer. Hence, the family support variable includes childcare, eldercare and 
other family support services.
18 Although child care services constitute approximately half of the 
services provided, they are only a third of the use of family support services. For this reason, we 
present here results for the three forms of family support services grouped into a single category. 
Around 2% of the workers report using this benefit and 12% report the benefit being available. 
For this variable, we are able to define use and availability directly, based on employee’s 
answers to these questions. This employee based definition of availability is not without 
problems however. Miss-reporting of availability may occur as employees that do not need the 
benefit are less likely to know about its availability.
19
According to the model specified above, use of benefits depends on family structure 
(captured through indicators for number and age of children and an indicator for marital status) 
and possibly on the demands of the job (measured by three indicators of usual hours of work). 
Additionally, workers from different cultures feel very strongly about the proper way to deal 
with family responsibilities and work demands or recent immigrants may face a different set of 
choices regarding family benefits due to less knowledge of Canadian institutions.
20 We control 
for this heterogeneity by including an indicator for Canadian born and for Caucasian ethnicity.  
                                                 
18 The questionnaire is not more specific about what other type of support that could be. It does not include fitness or 
recreational services or employee assistance (counselling, financial assistance, legal aid etc), which are specifically 
asked for in other questions.  
19 When we performed the analysis using a similar measure of availability to that employed in the analysis of 
flexible hours or telework, we obtain similar qualitative results. These results are available upon request. 
20 For instance, Caputo (2000) reports that, in the US, race is a determinant of benefit incidence. 
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Availability depends on a vector of workplace characteristics reflecting: a) worker’s and 
firm’s characteristics, and b) characteristics of the strata where the firm is more likely to draw 
their employees. The first group includes five indicators for industry (primary industries is the 
reference group), four occupational indicators (production workers is the reference group), three 
indicators for firm size (firms with less than 20 workers is the reference group), measures of 
tenure and experience, three indicators for numbers of hours worked and four educational 
indicators (no educational degree is the omitted category). We also include an indicator for 
whether the worker is unionized or covered by collective agreement since unionization may 
affect the likelihood of certain benefits being offered. As mentioned, a firm of certain size may 
face technical constraints in offering daycare services to its employees. Alternatively, it may also 
face difficulties offering telework to workers of certain education level because of the nature of 
the work they do, or it may be forced to offer flexible hours to individuals working long shifts. 
The second group of variables includes a measure of the fraction of skilled workers and skilled 
working women in the corresponding strata, a measure of the fraction of women in the strata that 
are of child bearing age and an indicator for whether or not the strata is highly unionized.
21 To 
discern whether the effect of unionization depends on the composition of the strata, we include 
an indicator for the fraction of women of child bearing age in the strata that are unionized. All 
models include indicators for geographical region.  
  In order to increase the number of benefit users, we pool the two available waves of the 
survey (1999-2000 and 2001-2002) and control for survey year in our analysis.
22 We report 
robust Huber-White standard errors, allowing for clustering among firms. We restrict the sample 
                                                 
21 A strata has a high degree of unionization if more than a quarter of its workers is unionized. While this choice is 
arbitrary, we tried different definitions of high degree of unionization with no effect on our estimates. 
22 Although, the WES follows employees for two years, the longitudinal feature of the data is too short to be used 
effectively in the analysis. There is close to zero variation in the take-up or availability of benefits across time.  
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to those workers who provided answers to the benefits and labour characteristics questions, 
which results in 33,082 observations for female workers and 43,212 for males. As it is traditional 
in this type of studies, we separate the genders because men and women are likely to have 
different levels of work-family conflict.  
We report the mean characteristics of the sample by use and availability of benefits in 
Table 1 (a) and (b) in the appendix, for female and male workers separately. Skill levels (tenure 
and experience) are similar among workers who use flexible hours and those who do not use this 
benefit. This is in contrast with the use of telework or family support, which are mostly 
associated with more educated and experienced workers. In general, users of benefits have more 
children, and their youngest child tends to be older, than nonusers, except for flexible hours. 
Note, however, that single parents are not more represented among the users of benefits 
(approximately the same fraction of single parents, around 9%, female (5% male) workers, can 
be counted among users and nonusers). Since it is difficult to argue against the need of those 
facing single parenthood to work in a family-friendly environment, this could suggest that the 
benefits are either not suitable or not available for this particular group. Surprisingly, married 
male workers are more represented in the telework and family support user categories than in the 
nonuser category, while married female workers are approximately equally represented in both 
categories. (Appendix table 1(a)).  
Available benefits, particularly family benefits, are more prevalent in large firms (over 
500 employees), although flexible hours and telework are similarly distributed among smaller 
firms (up to 49 employees). There is also a higher fraction of managerial and professional 
females that have these benefits available to them, relative to other occupations. Most labour 
market characteristics appear unrelated to the availability of flexible hours. However, family 
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benefits are more prevalent in firms located in stratas with high fractions of skilled workers, high 
unionization rates or high fractions of females of child bearing age. (Appendix Table 1(b)). 
4. The Use of Family-friendly Benefits 
Table 1 shows the percentage of use and availability of benefits by gender and family type. 
There is no a priori evidence that females or families with dependents use family-friendly 
benefits more than other groups. The proportion of female (male) users of flexible time ranges 
only between 33.5% and 36.3% (38.2% to 41.2%) across all family types. There is some 
evidence of higher use of telework and family support among workers with dependents, but the 
differences are surprisingly small. Between 5.5% and 7.3% of workers with dependents use 
telework, versus 3.4% to 7.3% for workers with no dependents; further, between 1.8% and 2.7% 
of workers with dependents use family benefits, versus 1.1% to 1.9% for workers with no 
dependents. In addition, although benefits are slightly less available to (female) single parents, 
the distribution of availability by family type reveals that most benefits are equally available 
among all family types and that some, such as telework, are even more likely to be available to 
female workers with children than to other females. The conditional (on availability) 
probabilities shown in the third and sixth column of Table 1 further confirms the small uptake of 
benefits, specifically of family benefits, which is not over 22% for any family type. Conditional 
on availability, telework is used on average by 53% of workers, whereas flexible time is used by 
around 67% of workers.  
We turn now to the main estimates of the paper, reported in Table 2. For each benefit we 
report the marginal effect of a change in the independent variable on the probability of use in 
columns labelled (I). We compare these estimates with those resulting from the selection model 
and report these in columns labelled (II). The correlation coefficient between the error terms in 
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the use and availability equations, ρ, is reported below each set of selection corrected estimates 
along with its p-value in parenthesis. The sign of the correlation coefficient (ρ) provides an 
intuition for the direction of the selection effect. Positive values of ρ indicate that unobservable 
factors that influence the probability of having benefits available also influence the probability of 
using benefits. In general, we expect this correlation to be positive as workers with higher family 
demands are more likely to seek out family-friendly benefits from their employers. If ρ is 
statistically significant, then the null hypothesis that the availability and use equations are 
independent can be rejected. The next row reports the results of the first stage F-test of the 
hypothesis that the excluded instruments are jointly zero in the first stage regression, followed by 
its  p-value. The next to last row reports the predicted probability of use conditional on 
availability (column I) and the predicted unconditional probability of use (column II). The 
unconditional probability can be interpreted as the fraction of workers who would use the benefit 
if it was available to every worker. Results are reported separately by gender because working 
women traditionally experience a larger share of work-family conflict. In particular, we expect 
that women find benefits more useful and also that they tend to select jobs with these benefits 
more often than men.  
Our main result is the relevance of accounting for selection to understand the incidence of 
benefit use. Contrary to what we anticipated, we do not observe significant differences in 
selection between men and women. In all cases, except for males using telework, we reject the 
null hypothesis of zero correlation between the error terms of the use and availability equations, 
indicating that the selection model is indeed appropriate. The correlation coefficient is, as 
expected, positive.   
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A second question was whether benefits were mismatched with workers needs. 
Mismatching can be identified by differences in the significance of the coefficients with and 
without correcting for selection. As discussed above, significant estimates in equation (2), but 
not in equation (1) would suggest that workers with available benefits do not use the benefit to 
reduce work-family conflict, although the benefit would be useful for the general population. 
This would support the hypothesis of a mismatch between use and availability of benefits. 
Alternatively, significant estimates in equation (1), but not in equation (2) would support the 
notion that workers with high levels of work-family conflict are more likely to be in jobs that 
offer family-friendly benefits (no mismatch). 
Flexible time does not seem to be used by most women as a solution to the work-family 
conflict. Both sets of estimates, in column (I) and (II), are not significant. For male workers and 
conditional on having children, the presence of pre-school children is positively and significantly 
related to the use of flexible hours among those with available benefits, an effect that remains 
after we consider selection. The similitude of estimates under both models indicates that the 
selection bias does not primarily affect the indicators for family conflict, suggesting that other, 
unaccounted for factors are driven the selection. Further, there is no indication that low use is 
due to lack of availability, since workers seem to be fully selected into this arrangement 
(indicated by the unchanged probability of use).  
The use of telework shows significant gender differences. Family characteristics do 
influence the use of telework among female workers who have the benefit available -- column (I) 
-- but these effects disappear when we consider selection. This suggests that family demands are 
a likely factor in the selection process leading females to the use of telework. For males, the 
estimates remain significant, and even increase in magnitude, after we account for selection. 
    21
However, the test of independence of equations reveals that selection corrected estimates are not 
sufficiently different from those obtained under the assumption of independence to warrant the 
use of the selection model (P-value = 0.11). This indicates that work-family conflict does not 
drive males to select into firms that offer telework. This is reinforced by the fact that the 
probability of males using telework is negatively correlated with the presence of older children, 
while conditional on having children females tend to use more telework with elementary school 
age children.
23 The difference in the sign of these estimates by gender supports the idea that 
while women seem to use telework to cope with childcare responsibilities, men with older 
children are less likely to use telework. The difference between the predicted probabilities in 
both models seems to indicate that lack of availability may account, at least for females, for low 
use of this benefit.  
The use of family support is not significantly influenced by indicators of family-work 
conflict, among workers who have the benefit available (column (I) under this benefit heading). 
However, once we account for selection, the presence of one or two older children has a 
significant impact on the likelihood of using this benefit for women (one child for men). 
Similarly, conditional on having children, women with school aged children are more likely to 
use this benefit when we account for selection. This is consistent with the observation that 
workers with high levels of family conflict are under-represented in firms that offer family 
support, and suggest the existence of a mismatch in the availability of family benefits. These 
appear to be available to workers who do not use them. Interestingly, single mothers are more 
likely to use these benefits than married mothers, further supporting the hypothesis that family 
                                                 
23 Telework may not be well suited to take care of younger children who require high levels of attention, but rather 
with school aged children to reduce commuting times.  
    22
benefits are most useful for workers with families and high potential work-family conflict.
24 The 
predicted probability of use would double if the benefit became available to all workers. 
However, it is a small impact (only 5% of all workers would use if it was generally available). 
This could indicate that formal care, even if conveniently located and facilitated by the firm, may 
be an expensive benefit for workers. 
Estimated coefficients for the first stage availability equation are displayed in Appendix 
Table 2.  
Robustness: Hours of Work and Single Parents 
In our analysis of use of benefits we have included indicators for hours of work to account for 
the existence of time constraints in taking care of family demands. This approach presumes that 
hours of work are exogenously determined. However, an important issue regarding the 
robustness of these estimates concerns the possible endogeneity of hours of work. This is a 
particular concern with the use of telework and flexible hours, since these benefits could be 
demanded for reasons other than the existence of family-work conflict as considered here. 
Hence, the choice of hours of work may be related to the choice of benefit use through some 
unobservable individual characteristic. It is plausible, for instance, that workers with low taste 
for rigid and demanding schedules choose both, jobs that are flexible or can be performed from 
home and less hours of work, regardless of family responsibilities. 
To check the robustness of our estimates to this problem we repeat the previous 
regressions for the sub-sample of full time workers and show the marginal effects in Table 3.
25 
                                                 
24 Single parents are represented by the intercept and the dummy variable indicating the number of children they 
have. Hence, a single parent is more likely to use the benefit than a married parent with the same number of children 
due to the negative effect of the “married” indicator.  
25 Conventional treatment of this endogeneity problem is complicated in our framework since we are already 
correcting for a selection issue. Moreover, the WES contains no suitable instruments to correct for this problem.  
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Results for female workers are virtually unchanged when considering the sample of full time 
workers, suggesting that our previous estimates were not strongly biased on this account. For full 
time males we observe some noteworthy changes. Most significant is the change in the sign of 
the correlation coefficient between use and availability of flexible hours, which becomes 
negative. This reinforces our previous results that the use of flexible time among males is 
unrelated to family-work conflict for full time male workers and that other, unaccounted for, 
characteristics are driving the selection of males into flexible hours. For the other two benefits, 
the estimates are similar, though slightly less precise. Overall the results for the full time sample 
of workers suggests that endogeneity of hours of work is unlikely to cause a strong bias in our 
previous estimates and reveal further gender differences in the use of benefits to cope with 
family responsibilities.  
Despite the considerable improvements the WES allows in the analysis of family-friendly 
practices, thanks to the sample structure and large sample sizes, individual responses pose a 
problem on the interpretation of results. Namely, having no information about overall availability 
of benefits for the household, we are unable to infer much from observed gender differences in 
use. In addition, we cannot generally address the specific question of whether or not one of the 
reasons for low use is “dual” access to benefits. We can, however, partially answer this question 
by looking at the probability of use among single parents, as this demographic group is less 
likely to have access to a partner’s benefits. If the selection corrected estimates of the effect of 
demographical variables on use are not significant for the single parent sample, it would suggest 
that the benefit in question is less adequate to deal with work and family demands, rather than 
the alternative explanation that the benefit is available through a partner’s job.  
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Table 4 shows the results from regressions similar to those in table 3 but estimated for the 
(gender pooled) sub-sample of single parents. To account for the small numbers of single parents 
in the sample, we have made the model more parsimonious. The use equation collapses the three 
indicators for age of the youngest child to a single indicator variable for children less than 11, 
and the three indicators for number of children to a unique indicator for the presence of more 
than one child. We observe similar trends for the subsample of single parents. For flexible hours, 
the only significant effect among selection corrected estimates is for the coefficient for the 
presence of (one) young child. However, the negative correlation coefficient suggests that 
selection is not guided by family work conflict. For use of telework and family support, female 
single parent seem more likely to use these than male single parents. In the case of telework, the 
presence of (one) young children increases the likelihood of use, whereas in the case of family 
support it is the presence of more than one (older) children that affects the likelihood of use. The 
difference in the estimates of demographic variables in (I) and (II) again suggests that family 
support is not available to single parents who would use them. Overall, the estimates reported in 
Table 4 do not suggest that dual access to benefits is a likely reason of low use of benefits, on the 
contrary, these estimates strengthen those from Table 3 since this sub-sample of workers is less 
likely to have meaningful access to a partner’s benefits.  
4. Conclusion 
We ask the following question regarding privately provided family-friendly benefits: why 
do we not observe higher levels of take-up for these benefits? Is it because benefits are not useful 
to workers, or is it because workers that need the benefits have no access to them? We use a 
unique data base that distinguishes between use and availability of benefits to account for worker 
selection into employment conditions, using technical constraints in the provision of available 
    25
benefits as exclusion restrictions in a two-step estimation procedure. We specifically consider 
flexible work scheduling, telework and family support services.  
Our analysis reveals two things. First, selection issues are important in understanding the 
take-up of employer provided benefits. Contrary to what was expected, however, it is not only 
women that select firms with family-friendly benefits (except for telework). Second, after 
correcting for selection, not all benefits are equally useful. Workers do not seem to use flexible 
schedules to achieve work-life balance. Telework, on the other hand, seems to be related to 
factors measuring family work conflict only for female workers. Family support services, such as 
day care, do not seem in turn, to be offered to workers who would find them more useful. These 
findings suggest that the market fails to help employees balance work and family demands.   
Because the empirical determination of benefit availability and benefit use is a complex 
process, our estimates are conditional on employment and assume that increasing privately 
offered benefits will have a negligible impact on an individual’s choice to work. We also abstract 
from the trade off between wage and benefits that is likely to be implicit in contract 
determination to focus on the factors that affect the actual use of benefits. We are also ignoring 
other endogeneity issues, such the choice of skills. We argue however, that since the benefits we 
are considering here, unlike other fringe benefits, are often informal, they are unlikely to be a 
fundamental determinant of labour contracts in general.  
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Table 1. Average characteristics by use of benefit 
  FEMALES 
  Flexible hours    Tele-work    Family Benefits   
  No   Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  
                   
H u m a n   C a p i t a l               
Tenure  0.64  0.56  0.61  0.64  0.61  0.62  
Experience  1.53  1.45  1.49  1.72  1.50  1.58  
Trade/College  0.53  0.54  0.54  0.47  0.54  0.54  
Bachelor’s  0.18  0.21  0.18  0.31  0.19  0.30  
Graduate  0.06  0.08  0.06  0.14  0.07  0.10  
Industry              
Manufacturing  0.12  0.08  0.11  0.08  0.11  0.09  
Construction  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.13  0.08  0.08  
Commerce  0.25  0.34  0.30  0.14  0.29  0.12  
Finance  0.18  0.18  0.17  0.24  0.18  0.18  
Other  Services  0.36  0.32  0.34  0.40  0.34  0.51  
Occupation              
Managerial  0.08  0.13  0.09  0.20  0.09  0.15  
Professional  0.19  0.20  0.19  0.34  0.19  0.24  
Technical  0.33  0.30  0.32  0.28  0.30  0.33  
Clerical  0.33  0.31  0.33  0.17  0.31  0.20  
Firm  size  49  0.27  0.29  0.28  0.28  0.28  0.22  
Firm  Size  499  0.20  0.17  0.19  0.18  0.18  0.23  
Firm  size  500  +  0.22  0.18  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.31  
Union  0.30  0.22  0.28  0.26  0.27  0.34  
S t r a t a *               
Skilled    0.29  0.28  0.28  0.28  0.28  0.34  
Skilled  females  0.16  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.19  
High  union  rates  0.42  0.35  0.39  0.38  0.39  0.54  
Female child bearing 
age (FCBA)  0.58  0.58  0.58  0.58  0.58  0.61  
Unionized  in  FCBA  0.19  0.14  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.22  
Demographics              
Married  0.67  0.67  0.66  0.67  0.67  0.67  
Single  parent  0.09  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.10  
Age  younger  child  6.01  5.92  5.91  7.17  5.96  6.81  
Number  children  0.86  0.88  0.85  1.16  0.86  1.09  
Canadian  born  0.82  0.83  0.82  0.82  0.82  0.76  
Caucasian  0.82  0.83  0.82  0.83  0.83  0.77  
              
Observations  22,281  10,801  31,101   1,981   32,361   721   
               
  MALES 
  Flexible hours    Tele-work    Family Benefits   
  No   Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes   
                     
Human  capital               
Tenure  0.73  0.62  0.69  0.66  0.69  0.68   
Experience  1.91  1.76  1.84  2.10  1.85  1.89   
Trade/College  0.48  0.46  0.47  0.43  0.47  0.52   
Bachelor’s  0.16  0.23  0.18  0.37  0.19  0.26   
Graduate  0.08  0.11  0.09  0.14  0.09  0.16     Industry               
Manufacturing  0.29  0.18  0.26  0.10  0.25  0.29   
Construction  0.21  0.22  0.21  0.27  0.21  0.17   
Commerce  0.22  0.25  0.23  0.16  0.23  0.14   
Finance  0.12  0.19  0.14  0.24  0.14  0.17   
Other  Services  0.14  0.15  0.14  0.22  0.14  0.20   
O c c u p a t i o n                
Managerial  0.14  0.22  0.16  0.36  0.17  0.20   
Professional  0.12  0.18  0.13  0.29  0.14  0.20   
Technical  0.54  0.44  0.51  0.30  0.50  0.43   
Clerical  0.11  0.10  0.11  0.04  0.10  0.08   
Firm  size  49  0.31  0.33  0.32  0.31  0.32  0.25   
Firm  Size  499  0.21  0.17  0.20  0.15  0.20  0.20   
Firm  size  500  +  0.20  0.18  0.19  0.21  0.19  0.40   
Union  0.31  0.21  0.29  0.17  0.28  0.33   
S t r a t a   *                
Skilled  0.23  0.24  0.23  0.28  0.23  0.28   
Skilled  females  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.13  0.10  0.12   
High  union  rates  0.42  0.32  0.39  0.31  0.38  0.52   
Female child bearing 
age (FCBA)  0.42  0.45  0.43  0.48  0.43  0.44   
FCBA  unionized  0.13  0.09  0.12  0.10  0.12  0.15   
D e m o g r a p h i c s                
Married  0.72  0.71  0.71  0.81  0.71  0.78   
Single  parent  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.04   
Age  younger  child  6.13  5.59  5.91  6.16  5.89  7.43   
Number  children  0.97  0.93  0.95  1.00  0.94  1.29   
Canadian  Born  0.81  0.81  0.81  0.81  0.81  0.77   
Caucasian  0.81  
  0.82 
  
  0.81 
  
  0.86 
  
  0.82 
  
  0.76 
   
     
Observations  27,223  15,989  40,841   2,371   42,432   780   
.                 
* A strata reflects the geographic location from where the firm is more likely to draw their workers. It 








































Table 2. Percentage Use and Availability of Benefits by Family Type 
 Females  Males 
 
Use of 
Flextime    Flextime 
Available    U/A*    Use of 
Flextime    Flextime 
Available    U/A* 
Family type                   
                   
No partner-no children  36.3    54.4    67    41.2    57.9    71 
Partner-no  children  34.6    53.0    65   39.3   58.6    67 
Partner  +  children  34.6    54.9    63   38.2   57.2    67 
No partner +children  33.5    50.6    66    38.4    57.8    66 
                   
Total  35.3    53.9    66   39.2   57.8    68 
                  
 
Use of 
Telework    Telework 
Available    U/A*    Use of 
Telework    Telework 
Available    U/A* 
No partner-no children  3.4    7.8    44    3.7    7.6    49 
Partner-no  children  5.2   10.2   51    7.3   12.8   57 
Partner  +  children  7.3   12.8   57    6.3   12.1   52 
No partner +children  6.3    9.7    65    5.5    11.6    47 
                   
Total  5.6   10.5   53    5.9   11.2   53 
                   
 
Use Family 




  U/A*    Use Family 




  U/A* 
No children - No partner  1.9    11.0    17    1.4    10.4    13 
No children - Partner  1.1    12.7    09    1.7    13.2    13 
Children  -  Partner  2.7   12.3   22    2.2   11.7   19 
Children - No partner  2.3    10.6    22    1.8    11.9    15 
                   
Total  2.0   12.0   17    1.9   11.9   16 
                   
U/A = Probability of use conditional on availability.  
 







Table 3. Estimates of the Marginal Effects of Family Characteristics on Use of Benefits by Gender. (P-values) 
  Flexible Hours     Telework    Family Benefits 
  Female    Male   Female    Male Female    Male 
  (I) (II)      (I)  (II)     (I)  (II)     (I)  (II)   (I)  (II)     (I)  (II)  
                            
Married 0.00  -0.01    -0.01  -0.02    0.02  0.02    0.03  0.09    -0.01  -0.02    0.00  0.01 
  (0.97)  (0.51)   (0.53) (0.14)  (0.00)  (0.46)  (0.00)  (0.06)  (0.11) (0.04)  (0.21)  (0.30) 
 Age 0-2  -0.02  -0.02    0.06  0.02    0.00  -0.03    -0.01  -0.05    0.00  0.03    -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.45)  (0.51)   (0.06) (0.45)  (0.72)  (0.70)  (0.22)  (0.46)  (0.99) (0.23)  (0.39)  (0.65) 
Age 3-5  0.05  0.05     0.05  0.06     -0.01  0.02    -0.00  -0.02    0.00  0.02    0.01  0.07 
  (0.30)  (0.08)   (0.07) (0.02)  (0.78)  (0.66)  (0.90)  (0.80)  (0.85) (0.50)  (0.22)  (0.08) 
Age 6-11  0.03  0.01     -0.00  0.02    0.02  0.05    0.01  0.16    0.01  0.08    0.00  0.03 
  (0.14)  (0.48)   (0.87) (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.28)  (0.15)  (0.00)  (0.02) (0.01)  (0.35)  (0.08) 
1  Child  -0.04  -0.04  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.06   -0.02 -0.13    0.01  0.05    -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.16)  (0.13)   (0.19) (0.61)  (0.11)  (0.42)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.31) (0.09)  (0.22)  (0.53) 
2 Children  -0.03  -0.03    0.04  -0.00    0.02  0.01    -0.01  -0.11    0.01  0.07    -0.00  0.00 
  (0.37)  (0.35)   (0.28) (0.89)  (0.22)  (0.93)  (0.22)  (0.15)  (0.16) (0.07)  (0.60)  (0.95) 
3 or more  -0.03  -0.01    0.04  -0.00    0.04  0.12    -0.02  -0.16    0.01  0.05    0.01  0.03 
  (0.49)  (0.86)   (0.24) (0.85)  (0.06)  (0.18)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.44) (0.22)  (0.35)  (0.40) 
Canadian Born   0.03  0.01    0.00  -0.03    -0.01  -0.01    -0.01  -0.03    -0.00  -0.00    0.00  0.01 
  (0.12)  (0.35)   (0.93) (0.01)  (0.33)  (0.73)  (0.58)  (0.55)  (0.50) (0.89)  (0.79)  (0.53) 
Caucasian  0.01  0.01   0.01  0.01  0.02  -0.00   0.02  0.06   -0.00 -0.02    -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.45)  (0.53)   (0.59) (0.51)  (0.00)  (0.94)  (0.02)  (0.19)  (0.56) (0.30)  (0.23)  (0.33) 
                                  
ρ  (p-value)
a   0.97 
(0.05) 
   0.96 
(0.00) 
   0.46 
(0.00) 
   0.18 
(0.11) 
  0.51 
(0.00) 
    0.49 
(0.00) 
First Stage Chi2
 b   0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00    0.00      0.00 
Predicted Prob.of Use  0.35  0.35    0.39  0.40   0.05  0.26   0.05  0.40  0.02 0.05    0.02  0.05 
Observations  33,082 33,082   43,212 43,212   33,082 33,082  43,212 43,212  33,082 33,082    43,212 43,212 
Note:  Column (I) shows marginal effects of use of benefit in a probit regression of use of benefit on family characteristics.  
   Column (II) shows marginal effects of use of benefit in a selection model for availability.  
    Both models control hours of work, year and geographical location.  
a Of the null hypothesis of zero correlation between the error terms of the use and availability equations.  
b Of the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are jointly zero in the first stage regression.      Table 4. Marginal Effects of Family Characteristics on Benefits Use. Full time workers (P-values) 
   
  Flexible hours    Telework    Family Benefits 
        
  Female Male  Female Male    Female  Male 
                
Married  -0.01 -0.02  0.01 0.09    -0.04  0.01 
  (0.35) (0.05)  (0.73) (0.12)    (0.03)  (0.25) 
 Age 0-2  -0.00 0.02  -0.02  -0.02    0.04  -0.02 
  (0.91) (0.39)  (0.73) (0.77)    (0.23)  (0.46) 
Age 3-5  0.05 0.06  0.01 0.00    0.03  0.07 
  (0.23) (0.03)  (0.85) (1.00)    (0.45)  (0.12) 
Age 6-11  0.02 0.03  0.08 0.18    0.11  0.04 
  (0.52) (0.08)  (0.07) (0.00)    (0.02)  (0.07) 
1 Child  -0.02 0.01  0.02 -0.09    0.09  -0.02 
  (0.57) (0.54)  (0.67) (0.23)    (0.08)  (0.46) 
2 Children  -0.01 -0.01  -0.01 -0.10    0.09  -0.00 
  (0.75) (0.73)  (0.88) (0.21)    (0.10)  (0.90) 
3 or more  0.01 -0.00  0.11 -0.13    0.06  0.04 
  (0.91) (0.96)  (0.23) (0.16)    (0.34)  (0.07) 
Canadian Born   0.02 -0.03  -0.01  -0.03    -0.02  0.00 
  (0.30) (0.09)  (0.74) (0.56)    (0.49)  (0.85) 
Caucasian  -0.00 0.00  -0.02 0.06    -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.92) (0.87)  (0.56) (0.21)    (0.53)  (0.42) 
                
                
ρ  
  0.85   -0.83  0.58   0.16     0.40  0.43  
(p-value)
a (0.01) (0.36)  (0.00) (0.20)    (0.00)  (0.00) 
First Stage F
 b 183.6 254.6  276.2 356.5    226.4  533.2 
Predicted Probability of use  0.36 0.81  0.19 0.40    0.07  0.06 
Observations  25,731 37,125  25,371 37.125    25,371  37.125 
Note:  
Models include controls for hours of work, year and location.  
Column (I) shows the marginal effects of family characteristics on use of benefit in a probit 
Column (II) shows the marginal effects of family characteristics on use of benefits in a selection model 
for availability. 
a Test statistic of zero correlation between the error terms of the availability and use equations.  





Table 5 . Estimates of the Marginal Effects of Family Characteristics on Use of Benefits for Single Parents (P-values) 
  Flexible Hours     Telework    Family Benefits 
                
  (I) (II)        (I)  (II)     (I)  (II)   
                     
Gender  0.06  0.01     -0.01  -0.17     -0.01  -0.02   
  (0.04)  (0.89)     (0.60)  (0.04)     (0.17)  (0.01)   
 Age youngest 0-11  -0.01  0.09      0.02  0.22      0.00  0.01   
  (0.74)  (0.07)     (0.14)  (0.01)     (0.88)  (0.28)   
Presence  of  Children  -0.02  0.02     0.00  0.01     0.01  0.01   
  (0.46)  (0.53)     (0.81)  (0.90)     (0.21)  (0.06)   
Canadian Born   -0.04  -0.10      0.02  0.01      0.01  0.01   
  (0.38)  (0.18)     (0.32)  (0.95)     (0.21)  (0.04)   
Caucasian  0.03  0.01     0.01  -0.08     -0.02  -0.02   
  (0.46)  (0.89)     (0.38)  (0.42)     (0.11)  (0.08)   
                     
ρ (p-value)
 a   -0.07 
(0.95)     0.08 
(0.81)       0.94    (0.00) 
 
First Stage Chi2
 b                        
Predicted Prob. of Use  0.34 0.68      0.05  0.54      0.02  0.02   
Observations 4,822  4,822      4,822  4,822     4,822  4,822   
Note:  
Column (I) shows the marginal effects of use of benefit in a probit regression of use of benefit on family characteristics.  
Column (II) shows the marginal effects of use of benefit in a selection model of use of benefit conditional on benefit availability.  
a Of the null hypothesis of zero correlation between the error terms of the use and availability equations.  
b Of the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are jointly zero in the first stage regression. 
 Appendix 
 
Columns labelled (I) show estimates of the influence of firm and labour market characteristics on the availability of benefits from an ordinary 
probit regression. Columns labelled (II) show the first stage regression coefficients of the joint bivariate probit model. These estimates indicate 
a correlation between highly qualified workers, or higher ranked occupations and availability of benefits. Firm characteristics such as firm size 
are also strongly correlated with the provision of benefits, with larger firms being more likely to supply benefits. Regarding labour market 
characteristics, a high fraction of females of child bearing age in the strata positively affects the availability of family benefits for females, but 
not for males. Further, male workers in stratas with a high degree of unionization are less likely to have access to telework or flexible time. We 
believe that this difference in effects by gender is related to the fact that these benefits are not, in general, suitable for manufacturing and 
primary industries, which encompass a high degree of unionized male workers. Females, on the other hand, are likely more concentrated in 
industries more suitable for the use of these benefits and can benefit from unionization.  
 
Table AIII. Estimates  of Firm and Labour Force Characteristics from the Availability / Selection Models by Gender  
  Flexible Hours    Telework    Family Benefits 
  Female   Male   Female   Male   Female   Male 
  (I)
(1) (II)
 (2)  (I)
(1) (II)
 (2)  (I)
(1) (II)
 (2)  (I)
(1) (II)
 (2)  (I)
(1) (II)
 (2)  (I)
(1) (II)
 (2)
                               
Tenure  -0.06 0.02    0.02  0.00    -0.01 -0.01    -0.03 -0.02    -0.05  -0.05    0.00  -0.00 
  (0.13) (0.39)    (0.63) (0.99)  (0.84) (0.73)    (0.27) (0.53)    (0.08) (0.09)   (0.87)  (0.87) 
Experience  -0.12 -0.10    -0.01 -0.00   0.24  0.21    0.18  0.16    0.05  0.04    -0.00  0.01 
  (0.12) (0.03)    (0.85) (0.95)  (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.01)    (0.39) (0.53)   (0.96)  (0.87) 
Trade/Col  0.03 -0.01    -0.10 -0.08    -0.03 -0.03    0.05 0.05    0.02 0.02    0.03  0.03 
  (0.11) (0.71)    (0.03) (0.05)  (0.46) (0.48)    (0.24) (0.21)    (0.66) (0.57)   (0.49)  (0.52) 
Bachelor  0.02 -0.00    0.09 -0.07    0.09 0.07    0.19 0.18    0.18 0.16    0.07  0.08 
  (0.50) (0.98)    (0.20) (0.26)  (0.11) (0.21)    (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)   (0.18)  (0.13) 
Graduate  0.14 -0.00    0.12  0.13    0.21 0.18    0.05 0.05    0.22 0.21    0.18  0.16 
  (0.03) (0.96)    (0.05) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.01)    (0.34) (0.37)    (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00) 
Union  -0.04  0.01  -0.15  -0.00  -0.30  -0.23  -0.36  -0.36  0.47  0.54   0.14  0.19 
  (0.04) (0.67)    (0.00) (0.97)  (0.11) (0.21)    (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)   (0.09)  (0.02) 
Manufacturing  -0.21  -0.33  -0.09  -0.11    -0.17  -0.14  -0.04  0.00   -0.60  -0.40   0.09  0.10 
  (0.09) (0.01)    (0.26) (0.07)  (0.34) (0.39)    (0.75) (0.98)    (0.00) (0.01)   (0.25)  (0.17) 
Construction  -0.17  -0.21   0.12  -0.01    0.27  0.33    0.44  0.47   -0.33  -0.16   0.25  0.25 
  (0.00) (0.10)    (0.15) (0.85)  (0.12) (0.04)    (0.00) (0.00)    (0.04) (0.29)   (0.00)  (0.00) 
Commercial  -0.04  -0.16  0.22  0.01    -0.25  -0.22  -0.16  0.17   -0.57  -0.41   0.15  0.16 
  (0.54) (0.19)    (0.03) (0.87)  (0.19) (0.22)    (0.28) (0.26)    (0.00) (0.01)   (0.11)  (0.08) 
Financial  -0.14  -0.29    0.50 0.18    0.11 0.12    0.31 0.31    -0.44  -0.32    0.05 0.032 
  (0.02) (0.02)    (0.00) (0.04)  (0.55) (0.49)    (0.04) (0.05)    (0.01) (0.04)   (0.63)  (0.85) 
Other Services  -0.12  -0.28    0.41 0.17    0.11 0.18    0.37 0.36    -0.45  -0.36    0.05  0.03 
  (0.07) (0.03)    (0.00) (0.08)  (0.58) (0.32)    (0.03) (0.03)    (0.01) (0.04)   (0.66)  (0.78) Manager  0.16 0.15    0.40 0.10    1.07 1.02    1.11 1.12    0.20 0.21    -0.11 -0.13 
  (0.00) (0.23)    (0.00) (0.24)  (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)    (0.05) (0.03)   (0.25)  (0.18) 
Professional  0.19 0.38    0.73 0.38    1.22 1.22    1.38 1.40    0.04 0.10    0.02  0.04 
  (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)    (0.68) (0.33)   (0.86)  (0.69) 
Technical  0.12 0.28    0.49 0.38    0.65 0.63    0.77 0.79    0.11 0.10    -0.09 -0.09 
  (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)    (0.21) (0.11)   (0.26)  (0.30) 
Clerk  0.02 0.07    0.16 0.08    0.36 0.34    0.39 0.40    -0.02  0.01    -0.05 -0.05 
  (0.59) (0.24)    (0.03) (0.21)  (0.01) (0.02)    (0.00) (0.00)    (0.81) (0.89)   (0.63)  (0.63) 
Firm size 20-49  0.08 0.24    0.21 0.20    0.06 0.13    0.19 0.21    0.22 0.26    0.27  0.28 
  (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)  (0.49) (0.12)    (0.01) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00) 
Firm size 50-499  0.04  0.19  0.23  0.24   -0.01  0.06  0.04  0.07  0.48  0.50   0.53  0.56 
  (0.09) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)  (0.84) (0.43)    (0.68) (0.44)    (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00) 
Firm size 500+  0.09 0.30    0.43 0.40    0.08 0.20    0.07 0.23    0.76 0.80    1.02  1.04 
  (0.01) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)  (0.49) (0.07)    (0.07) (0.02)    (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00) 
Labour Force Characteristics (In Strata)
(3)                   
Skilled   0.20  0.43  -0.84  -0.43  -0.27  -0.05  0.70  0.82  0.82  0.97   1.34  1.31 
  (0.34) (0.24)    (0.03) (0.10)  (0.66) (0.93)    (0.14) (0.08)    (0.10) (0.07)   (0.00)  (0.00) 
Skilled females  -0.10 -0.37    -0.28  0.11  2.13  1.42    0.07 -0.16    0.44  0.40   0.15  0.31 
  (0.76) (0.50)    (0.69) (0.84)  (0.02) (0.11)    (0.93) (0.84)    (0.55) (0.59)   (0.84)  (0.65) 
High union rates  0.01  0.03  -0.08  -0.03  -0.10  -0.14  -0.14  -0.15  0.02  -0.00   0.09  0.04 
  (0.55) (0.35)    (0.12) (0.39)  (0.25) (0.09)    (0.04) (0.03)    (0.80) (0.88)   (0.06)  (0.38) 
FCBA
(4) -0.13  0.14  -0.47  -0.32  -0.88  -0.64  -0.35  -0.18  0.42  0.55   0.03  0.10 
  (0.17) (0.42)    (0.02) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.03)    (0.18) (0.51)    (0.10) (0.04)   (0.80)  (0.64) 
Unionized*FCBA  0.22  -0.13  -0.36  -0.39    -0.02  -0.07   0.69  0.59   -0.75  -0.89   -0.33  -0.43 
  (0.79) (0.48)    (0.14) (0.08)  (0.95) (0.83)    (0.00) (0.01)    (0.00) (0.00)   (0.07)  (0.02) 
                               
Observations  33,082 33,082   43,212 43,212  33,082 33,082   43,212 43,212  33,082 33,082  43,212  43,212 
NOTE:  (1) Column (I) shows estimates of the coefficients of a benefit availability probit regression on work, firm and labour force characteristics.  
 (2) Column (II) shows estimates of the coefficients of the first stage selection equation corresponding to model (2). 
      (3) A strata reflects the geographic location from where the firm is more likely to draw their workers. It is defined by the set of observations in a given province, 
industry, and for a given firm size. 
 (4) FCBA stands for Females of Child Bearing Age  
Both models include controls for hours of work, year and location.  
 Appendix 
 
Table 1(a). Average characteristics by use of benefit 
  FEMALES 
  Flexible hours    Tele-work    Family Benefits   
  No   Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  
               
D e m o g r a p h i c s               
Married  0.67  0.67  0.66  0.67  0.67  0.67  
Single  parent  0.09  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.10  
Age  younger  child  6.01  5.92  5.91  7.17  5.96  6.81  
Number  children  0.86  0.88  0.85  1.16  0.86  1.09  
Canadian  born  0.82  0.83  0.82  0.82  0.82  0.76  
Caucasian  0.82  0.83  0.82  0.83  0.83  0.77  
               
Observations  22,281  10,801  31,101   1,981   32,361   721   
               
MALES 
  Flexible hours    Tele-work    Family Benefits   
  No   Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  
               
D e m o g r a p h i c s               
Married  0.72  0.71  0.71  0.81  0.71  0.78  
Single  parent  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.04  
Age  younger  child  6.13  5.59  5.91  6.16  5.89  7.43  
Number  children  0.97  0.93  0.95  1.00  0.94  1.29  
Canadian  Born  0.81  0.81  0.81  0.81  0.81  0.77  
Caucasian  0.81  0.82  0.81  0.86  0.82  0.76  
               




























  Table 1(b). Mean characteristics by availability of benefit 
  FEMALES 
  Flexible hours    Tele-work    Family Benefits   
  No    Yes    No    Yes    No    Yes   
                   
Human Capital                  
Tenure  0.63    0.60   0.61  0.64  0.61  0.68   
Experience  1.55    1.46   1.48  1.66  1.47  1.70   
Trade/College  0.54    0.54   0.54  0.50  0.54  0.52   
Bachelor’s  0.16    0.22   0.18  0.33  0.18  0.30   
Graduate  0.06    0.17   0.06  0.14  0.06  0.12   
Industry                  
Manufacturing  0.13    0.09   0.11  0.06  0.11  0.07   
Construction  0.09    0.07   0.08  0.12  0.08  0.07   
Commerce  0.26    0.30   0.30  0.11  0.30  0.11   
Finance  0.19    0.17   0.17  0.22  0.18  0.19   
Other Services  0.33    0.37   0.33  0.49  0.32  0.56   
Occupation                  
Managerial  0.08    0.11   0.09  0.16  0.09  0.11   
Professional  0.15    0.23   0.17  0.45  0.18  0.32   
Technical  0.31    0.32   0.33  0.25  0.32  0.30   
Clerical  0.37    0.28   0.33  0.13  0.34  0.22   Firm size 49  0.26    0.29   0.28  0.26  0.29  0.18   
Firm Size 499  0.19    0.18   0.19  0.15  0.18  0.21   
Firm size 500 +  0.18    0.23   0.20  0.32  0.17  0.47   
Union  0.27    0.27   0.27  0.27  0.24  0.42   
Strata *                  
Skilled   0.27    0.29   0.28  0.34  0.27  0.37   
Skilled females  0.15    0.16   0.15  0.19  0.15  0.21   
High union rates  0.37    0.41   0.38  0.47  0.36  0.61   
Female child bearing 
age (FCBA)  0.58    0.59   0.58  0.60  0.58  0.61   
FCBA unionized  0.17    0.18   0.17  0.18  0.16  0.28   
                   
Observations  15,621  17,461   29,300   3,782   29,177   3,905  
                   
  MALES 
  Flexible hours    Tele-work    Family Benefits   
  No   Yes   No   Yes    No    Yes   
                  
Human Capital                 
Tenure  0.71    0.67   0.69  0.71  0.68  0.77  
Experience  1.89    1.83   1.83  2.04  1.83  1.99  
Trade/College  0.48    0.47   0.48  0.44  0.47  0.46  
Bachelor’s  0.16    0.21   0.17  0.35  0.18  0.28  
Graduate  0.08    0.10   0.09  0.16  0.08  0.16  
Industry                 
Manufacturing  0.28    0.21   0.26  0.11  0.25  0.25  
Construction  0.21    0.21   0.20  0.25  0.22  0.16  
Commerce  0.24    0.23   0.24  0.13  0.24  0.13  
Finance  0.11    0.17   0.13  0.22  0.14  0.15  
Other Services  0.12    0.16   0.13  0.27  0.12  0.28  
Occupation                 
Managerial  0.17    0.17   0.16  0.27  0.17  0.14  
Professional  0.10    0.17   0.12  0.35  0.13  0.26  
Technical  0.49    0.51   0.52  0.34  0.51  0.43  
Clerical  0.13    0.09   0.11  0.03  0.11  0.08  
Firm size 49  0.31    0.33   0.32  0.32  0.34  0.18  
Firm Size 499  0.21    0.19   0.20  0.16  0.20  0.21  
Firm size 500 +  0.17    0.21   0.18  0.28  0.15  0.51  
Union  0.31    0.26   0.29  0.26  0.26  0.42  
Strata *                 
Skilled   0.22    0.24   0.23  0.30  0.23  0.31  
Skilled females  0.09    0.10   0.09  0.14  0.09  0.14  
High union rates  0.40    0.37   0.39  0.36  0.36  0.59  
Female child bearing 
age (FCBA)  0.42    0.44   0.43  0.48  0.43  0.45  
FCBA unionized  0.12    0.11   0.11  0.14  0.11  0.20  
                  
Observations  17,458  25,754   38,396   4,816   38,401   4,811  
                   
* A strata reflects the geographic location from where the firm is more likely to draw their workers. 
It is defined by the set of observations in a given province, industry, and for a given firm size. 
  
Columns labelled (I) show estimates of the influence of firm and labour market characteristics on the availability of benefits from an ordinary 
probit regression. Columns labelled (II) show the first stage regression coefficients of the joint bivariate probit model. These estimates indicate 
a correlation between highly qualified workers, or higher ranked occupations and availability of benefits. Firm characteristics such as firm size 
are also strongly correlated with the provision of benefits, with larger firms being more likely to supply benefits. Regarding labour market 
characteristics, a high fraction of females of child bearing age in the strata positively affects the availability of family benefits for females, but 
not for males. Further, male workers in stratas with a high degree of unionization are less likely to have access to telework or flexible time. We 
believe that this difference in effects by gender is related to the fact that these benefits are not, in general, suitable for manufacturing and 
primary industries, which encompass a high degree of unionized male workers. Females, on the other hand, are likely more concentrated in 
industries more suitable for the use of these benefits and can benefit from unionization.  
 
Table 2. Estimates  of Firm and Labour Force Characteristics from the Availability / Selection Models by Gender  
  Flexible Hours    Telework    Family Benefits 
  Female   Male   Female   Male   Female   Male 
  (I)
(1) (II)
 (2)  (I)
(1) (II)
 (2)  (I)
(1) (II)
 (2)  (I)
(1) (II)
 (2)  (I)
(1) (II)
 (2)  (I)
(1) (II)
 (2)
                               
Tenure  -0.06 0.02    0.02  0.00    -0.01 -0.01    -0.03 -0.02    -0.05  -0.05    0.00  -0.00 
  (0.13) (0.39)    (0.63) (0.99)  (0.84) (0.73)    (0.27) (0.53)    (0.08) (0.09)   (0.87)  (0.87) 
Experience  -0.12 -0.10    -0.01 -0.00   0.24  0.21    0.18  0.16    0.05  0.04    -0.00  0.01 
  (0.12) (0.03)    (0.85) (0.95)  (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.01)    (0.39) (0.53)   (0.96)  (0.87) 
Trade/Col  0.03 -0.01    -0.10 -0.08    -0.03 -0.03    0.05 0.05    0.02 0.02    0.03  0.03 
  (0.11) (0.71)    (0.03) (0.05)  (0.46) (0.48)    (0.24) (0.21)    (0.66) (0.57)   (0.49)  (0.52) 
Bachelor  0.02 -0.00    0.09 -0.07    0.09 0.07    0.19 0.18    0.18 0.16    0.07  0.08 
  (0.50) (0.98)    (0.20) (0.26)  (0.11) (0.21)    (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)   (0.18)  (0.13) 
Graduate  0.14 -0.00    0.12  0.13    0.21 0.18    0.05 0.05    0.22 0.21    0.18  0.16 
  (0.03) (0.96)    (0.05) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.01)    (0.34) (0.37)    (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00) 
Union  -0.04  0.01  -0.15  -0.00  -0.30  -0.23  -0.36  -0.36  0.47  0.54   0.14  0.19 
  (0.04) (0.67)    (0.00) (0.97)  (0.11) (0.21)    (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)   (0.09)  (0.02) 
Manufacturing  -0.21  -0.33  -0.09  -0.11    -0.17  -0.14  -0.04  0.00   -0.60  -0.40   0.09  0.10 
  (0.09) (0.01)    (0.26) (0.07)  (0.34) (0.39)    (0.75) (0.98)    (0.00) (0.01)   (0.25)  (0.17) 
Construction  -0.17  -0.21   0.12  -0.01    0.27  0.33    0.44  0.47   -0.33  -0.16   0.25  0.25 
  (0.00) (0.10)    (0.15) (0.85)  (0.12) (0.04)    (0.00) (0.00)    (0.04) (0.29)   (0.00)  (0.00) 
Commercial  -0.04  -0.16  0.22  0.01    -0.25  -0.22  -0.16  0.17   -0.57  -0.41   0.15  0.16 
  (0.54) (0.19)    (0.03) (0.87)  (0.19) (0.22)    (0.28) (0.26)    (0.00) (0.01)   (0.11)  (0.08) 
Financial  -0.14  -0.29    0.50 0.18    0.11 0.12    0.31 0.31    -0.44  -0.32    0.05 0.032 
  (0.02) (0.02)    (0.00) (0.04)  (0.55) (0.49)    (0.04) (0.05)    (0.01) (0.04)   (0.63)  (0.85) 
Other Services  -0.12  -0.28    0.41 0.17    0.11 0.18    0.37 0.36    -0.45  -0.36    0.05  0.03 
  (0.07) (0.03)    (0.00) (0.08)  (0.58) (0.32)    (0.03) (0.03)    (0.01) (0.04)   (0.66)  (0.78) 
Manager  0.16 0.15    0.40 0.10    1.07 1.02    1.11 1.12    0.20 0.21    -0.11 -0.13   (0.00) (0.23)    (0.00) (0.24)  (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)    (0.05) (0.03)   (0.25)  (0.18) 
Professional  0.19 0.38    0.73 0.38    1.22 1.22    1.38 1.40    0.04 0.10    0.02  0.04 
  (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)    (0.68) (0.33)   (0.86)  (0.69) 
Technical  0.12 0.28    0.49 0.38    0.65 0.63    0.77 0.79    0.11 0.10    -0.09 -0.09 
  (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)    (0.21) (0.11)   (0.26)  (0.30) 
Clerk  0.02 0.07    0.16 0.08    0.36 0.34    0.39 0.40    -0.02  0.01    -0.05 -0.05 
  (0.59) (0.24)    (0.03) (0.21)  (0.01) (0.02)    (0.00) (0.00)    (0.81) (0.89)   (0.63)  (0.63) 
Firm size 20-49  0.08 0.24    0.21 0.20    0.06 0.13    0.19 0.21    0.22 0.26    0.27  0.28 
  (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)  (0.49) (0.12)    (0.01) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00) 
Firm size 50-499  0.04  0.19  0.23  0.24   -0.01  0.06  0.04  0.07  0.48  0.50   0.53  0.56 
  (0.09) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)  (0.84) (0.43)    (0.68) (0.44)    (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00) 
Firm size 500+  0.09 0.30    0.43 0.40    0.08 0.20    0.07 0.23    0.76 0.80    1.02  1.04 
  (0.01) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)  (0.49) (0.07)    (0.07) (0.02)    (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00) 
Labour Force Characteristics (In Strata)
(3)                   
Skilled   0.20  0.43  -0.84  -0.43  -0.27  -0.05  0.70  0.82  0.82  0.97   1.34  1.31 
  (0.34) (0.24)    (0.03) (0.10)  (0.66) (0.93)    (0.14) (0.08)    (0.10) (0.07)   (0.00)  (0.00) 
Skilled females  -0.10 -0.37    -0.28  0.11  2.13  1.42    0.07 -0.16    0.44  0.40   0.15  0.31 
  (0.76) (0.50)    (0.69) (0.84)  (0.02) (0.11)    (0.93) (0.84)    (0.55) (0.59)   (0.84)  (0.65) 
High union rates  0.01  0.03  -0.08  -0.03  -0.10  -0.14  -0.14  -0.15  0.02  -0.00   0.09  0.04 
  (0.55) (0.35)    (0.12) (0.39)  (0.25) (0.09)    (0.04) (0.03)    (0.80) (0.88)   (0.06)  (0.38) 
FCBA
(4) -0.13  0.14  -0.47  -0.32  -0.88  -0.64  -0.35  -0.18  0.42  0.55   0.03  0.10 
  (0.17) (0.42)    (0.02) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.03)    (0.18) (0.51)    (0.10) (0.04)   (0.80)  (0.64) 
Unionized*FCBA  0.22  -0.13  -0.36  -0.39    -0.02  -0.07   0.69  0.59   -0.75  -0.89   -0.33  -0.43 
  (0.79) (0.48)    (0.14) (0.08)  (0.95) (0.83)    (0.00) (0.01)    (0.00) (0.00)   (0.07)  (0.02) 
                               
Observations  33,082 33,082   43,212 43,212  33,082 33,082   43,212 43,212  33,082 33,082  43,212  43,212 
NOTE:  (1) Column (I) shows estimates of the coefficients of a benefit availability probit regression on work, firm and labour force characteristics.  
 (2) Column (II) shows estimates of the coefficients of the first stage selection equation corresponding to model (2). 
      (3) A strata reflects the geographic location from where the firm is more likely to draw their workers. It is defined by the set of observations in a given province, 
industry, and for a given firm size. 
 (4) FCBA stands for Females of Child Bearing Age  
Both models include controls for hours of work, year and location.  
 